US President Donald Trump’s upcoming tour of the Gulf region will include visits to Saudi Arabia, where he hopes to encourage recognition of Israel, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which has benefited from its ties with Israel but also faces challenges as a result.
During his first term, Trump facilitated a series of normalization agreements between Israel and several Arab nations, which surprised many and disrupted the longstanding belief that a fair resolution for Palestinians must come before formal relations with Israel.
Despite the passage of nearly five years since the UAE, alongside Bahrain and Morocco, entered the US-negotiated Abraham Accords, these agreements have persisted even amid the severe backlash following the Israel-Hamas conflict in Gaza.
“If the Gaza war did not terminate these ties, then nothing will,” remarked Emirati analyst Abdulkhaleq Abdulla.
Although establishing relations with Israel has provided the UAE with economic and strategic advantages, its reputation within the region has suffered, according to experts.
Economic Relations and Challenges
While both the UAE and Saudi Arabia are wealthy Gulf nations, the implications of potential normalization with Israel weigh more heavily on Saudi Arabia due to reputational risks at home and within the larger Arab and Muslim communities.
The Abraham Accords have granted the UAE considerable influence in Washington, as noted by Karim Bitar, a lecturer at Sciences Po in Paris. However, with the onset of the Gaza conflict in October 2023, the UAE’s perceived standing in the Arab world has diminished, losing much of the leverage it had gained in the US.
Trade between Israel and the UAE has been robust, expanding by 43 percent in the past year to reach $3.24 billion, according to Liron Zaslansky, Israel’s consul general in Dubai—though this figure does not account for software and services. Approximately 600 Israeli businesses have established a presence in the UAE, and about one million Israeli tourists visited in 2024. In contrast, the number of Emirati tourists traveling to Israel is significantly lower, particularly since Hamas initiated its attack on October 7.
Collaboration in technology and intelligence has enabled the UAE to counter regional adversaries, including Iran, while the support and focus from the US—a key ally of Israel—has been a major advantage for the UAE. The UAE was designated a significant defense partner with the US last year, although a deal for advanced weaponry, including 50 F-35 stealth fighters, has yet to be realized.
Shifting Perspectives
Riyadh is acutely aware of the UAE’s declining reputation among Arabs following its recognition of Israel. A January 2024 poll conducted by the Arab Center in Washington, D.C., revealed that a significant majority of Saudis were opposed to recognizing Israel, marking a stark increase from a survey in 2022 where only 38 percent expressed opposition.
During the recent conflict, the UAE faced accusations of “treachery” from the Palestinians but argued that normalization with Israel had secured promises from Israel to halt plans for annexing parts of the West Bank. Nonetheless, actions taken by Israel throughout the Gaza war have showcased the UAE’s limited influence with its new ally.
According to Emirati officials, they have been able to assist in delivering aid to Gaza during the conflict, and Abdulla noted that most Emiratis “trust the government” to act in the nation’s interest, despite widespread disapproval among Arabs regarding Israel’s actions in Gaza.
Prior to the war, Saudi Arabia had begun preliminary talks with the US regarding the potential for normalization with Israel, in exchange for a security framework and support for a civilian nuclear initiative. However, since then, the kingdom clarified that it would not consider normalization without a Palestinian state.
Sanam Vakil from Chatham House stated that the Abraham Accords serve as a “case study” for Saudi Arabia, highlighting benefits such as trade and investment ties with the US, but also indicating limitations regarding Palestinian concerns and interpersonal connections.
Unlike Saudi Arabia, the UAE’s population primarily consists of foreigners, reducing the likelihood of destabilization through popular dissent. Additionally, Saudi Arabia’s position as the guardian of Islam’s sacred sites amplifies the complexities and sensitivities surrounding potential normalization, leading Bitar to conclude, “I believe Saudi Arabia will likely reconsider before mimicking the UAE’s path.”